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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. : 
STUART FOSTER HOUGHTON, : Case No. 20010020-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The State argues that, even if three jury instructions are legally incorrect, 
argumentative, confusing, and overemphasize one element of the charge, prejudice is not 
presumed. Appellee's Br. 15-17,21-22. The State's argument is contrary to the case law. 
It has long been held that instructions must be evaluated as a whole, and as a whole, they 
"must accurately and adequately inform a [criminal] jury as to the basic elements of the 
crime charged." State v. Larsen, 876 P.2d 391, 396 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Where the jury 
is not so charged, prejudice is presumed. State v. Laine. 618 P.2d 33, 35 (Utah 1980). 
This has been applied in a variety of contexts. Cases from other jurisdictions are 
particularly instructive. Prejudice has been presumed where instructions overemphasized 
a particular element of the charge1 and where instructions described the specific 
1
 Haith v. District of Columbia, 526 A.2d 17, 20 (D.C. 1987); Fravel v. Morenz, 502 
N.E.2d 480, 482 (111. Ct. App. 1986); and Williamson v. Swank. 276 N.E.2d 737, 739-40 (111. Ct. 
App. 1971). 
circumstances of the case and then invited the jury to draw particular conclusions.2 
Prejudice has even been presumed where only one incorrect word was used in describing 
an affirmative defense to a homicide charge.3 In this case, prejudice should be presumed 
because, as a whole, the instructions failed to accurately and adequately instruct the jury 
on the basic elements of the crime charged. 
The State further argues that Mr. Houghton failed to preserve the issue of the legal 
correctness of instructions seven and eleven. Appellee's Br. 12-13. However, the defense 
counsel objected to instructions seven, ten, and eleven on the basis that they did not 
amount "to statement of the law . . . ." R. 141 [186]. Under Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, an issue is preserved so long as the substance is stated to the trial 
court. Utah R. Crim. 19(e) (Oct. 2001 Supp.) Here, the substance of defense counsel's 
objection went to the legal correctness of instructions seven, ten, and eleven, and the 
issue was, therefore, preserved. 
Even if it was not, the issue should be reviewed to avoid manifest injustice. This 
Court has held that the failure to give an accurate charge on the basic elements of the 
offense should be reviewed even when it is not preserved to avoid manifest injustice. 
State v. Stringham. 957 P.2d 602, 608 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Instruction seven is 
inaccurate because it focuses upon whether the child's circumstances were inadequate, 
2
 Smith v. Canevarv. 553 So.2d 1312, 1316 (Fla. Ct. App. 1989); King v. Baker. 136 
S.E.2d 8, 10 (Ga. Ct. App. 1964); U.S. V. Schilleci. 525 F.2d 519, 524 (5th Cir. 1977). 
3
 State v. Hundley. 693 P.2d 475,480 (Kan. 1985). 
2 
rather than needy. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201(1) (1999) (focusing upon whether the 
child's circumstances are needy). Instruction eleven is inaccurate because it imposes a 
"diligence" standard upon Mr. Houghton even though such as standard is not supported 
by statutory or case law. R. 87. Also, instruction eleven conflicts with instruction ten, 
which mandates a "reasonableness" standard. R. 86. 
The State's argument that instructions ten and eleven may be reconciled on the 
basis of a 1933 California Court of Appeals case and a Nevada case employing the term 
"reasonable diligence" in describing the statutory standard, Appellee's Br. 19, fails. Not 
only are these cases not controlling, they do not even accurately state the law in their own 
jurisdictions. Additionally, the terms "diligence," "reasonableness," and "reasonable 
diligence" are each defined differently. Therefore, instructions ten and eleven cannot be 
reconciled, instruction eleven is incorrect, and issue of the legal correctness of 
instructions seven and eleven should be reviewed. 
The State's argument that instructions one, twelve, and thirteen remedy the 
argumentativeness, confusion, and overemphasis in instructions seven, ten, and eleven is 
unpersuasive. The flaws of instructions seven, ten, and eleven damage the legal 
instruction as a whole, and instructions one and twelve focus upon the jury's duty as fact 
finder. R. 76, 88. Instruction thirteen focuses upon reading the instructions as a whole. R. 
89. This is not helpful because Mr. Houghton's core argument is that, as a whole, the 
instructions are incorrect, argumentative, confusing, and overemphasize one element of 
the charge. Appellate Br. 12-15. 
3 
Finally, the State's argument that Mr. Houghton's conviction is supported by 
sufficient evidence fails. Contrary to the State's assertion, Mr. Houghton marshaled the 
evidence by accurately describing his college and work experience, and directly citing to 
evidence that set these things out in detail. Aplt. Br. 4-9, 29. Further, the State 
mischaracterizes evidence relating to Mr. Houghton's hand tremors. His former wife did 
not testify that the tremors correlated with drinking, as the State asserts. Appellee's Br. 
31. She testified that nervousness intensified the tremors and that she thought that 
drinking was also related. R. 141 [73-74]. Additionally, a medical examination was not 
conducted on his hands. The doctor merely discussed the tremors with him for a minute 
or two. R. 141 [117-18]. Lastly, Mr. Houghton took the prescribed medication for his 
tremors for nine months and stopped taking it because he saw no improvement. R. 141 
[119]. In sum, Mr. Houghton's conviction for Criminal Nonsupport fails, and the State 
has failed to point out any additional evidence which supports the conviction. 
ARGUMENT 
I. AS A MATTER OF LAW, PREJUDICE IS PRESUMED IN THIS CASE 
BECAUSE THE JURY WAS NOT ACCURATELY INSTRUCTED 
REGARDING THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME 
The State's argument that Mr. Houghton must establish that incorrect, 
argumentative, and superfluous jury instructions were harmful, Appellee's Br. 17, 21-22, 
reflects a misunderstanding of the law. Beginning with State v. Laine in 1980, Utah 
courts have consistently held that "[a]n accurate instruction upon the basic elements of 
4 
the offense charged is essential, and the failure to so instruct constitutes reversible 
error."4 Since Laine, Utah courts have applied this concept in a variety of contexts, 
including the trial court's failure to give an elements instruction on the charge of 
aggravated kidnapping, State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1991), the court's 
response to a jury question regarding terms used in the instructions,5 the court's failure to 
relate the mens rea instruction to an elements instruction, State v. Stringhairu 957 P.2d 
602, 608-09 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), and the court's failure to instruct on the mens rea for 
each element of the charge. State v. Pearson. 1999 UT App 220, ^[13, 985 P.2d 919. 
The State contends, however, that "prejudice is presumed only when a reviewing 
court cannot determine whether the jury found all the elements of the offense . . . for 
example, when the trial court fails to give an elements instruction, or when an elements 
instruction given omits an element that was at issue."Appellee's Br. 16. This is 
unacceptably narrow. Utah courts have never assumed that, simply because there is one 
accurate elements instruction, the inclusion of incorrect statements of the law or the 
4
 State v. Laine. 618 P.2d 33, 35 (Utah 1980) (citing State v. Miller, 565 P.2d 228 (Kan. 
1977); Thomas v. State. 522 P.2d 528 (Alaska 1974); State v. Puga. 510 P.2d 1075 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 1973); Dougherty v. State. 471 P.2d 212, 213 (Nev. 1970); and 23A CJ.S. Criminal Law, § 
1193). 
5
 State v. Souza. 846 P.2d 1313, 1320 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). In Souza the jury sent a note 
to the trial court requesting clarification of words in an instruction relating to the charge of 
supplying alcohol to minors. Id. at 1316. In response, the court submitted to the jury copies of 
Black's Law Dictionary and Webster's Collegiate Dictionary with the relevant words marked. 
Id. This Court found that this was not error. Id. at 1321. 
5 
overemphasis of a particular element is not reversible error.6 On the contrary, Utah cases 
have mandated that jury instructions be evaluated as a whole.7 As a whole they "must 
accurately and adequately inform a [criminal] jury as to the basic elements of the crime 
charged." Larsen, 876 P.2d at 396. Although the slight inaccuracy of a sole instruction is 
not reversible error, Lucero, 866 P.2d at 3, instructions that contain incorrect statements 
of the law, are argumentative, and heavily overemphasize one element of the crime over 
another are presumed harmful. This is so because such instructions confuse and mislead 
the jury with regard to the basic elements of the crime charged. 
Further, cases from other jurisdictions have specifically recognized that 
instructions which are incorrect, argumentative, or heavily emphasize one element over 
another are presumed harmful. 
Significantly, in an action against an automobile driver who struck a pedestrian, 
the Illinois Court of Appeals found that, where one jury instruction focused solely upon 
the duties of a pedestrian and ignored the duties of a driver, prejudice was presumed even 
though a complete elements instruction was given. Williamson v. Swank. 276 N.E.2d 
737, 739-40 (111. Ct. App. 1971). Likewise, in a slip and fall case against a grocery store, 
6
 See Souza 846 P.2d at 1320-22 (analyzing trial court's provision of definition of terms 
to a jury even though an accurate elements instruction was given); Stringham, 957 P.2d at 608 
(finding jury instructions defective when separate mens rea instruction was not sufficiently 
related to elements instruction). 
7
 State v. Lucero. 866 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). See also State v. Bingham. 684 
P.2d 43, 45 (Utah 1984) (quoting State v. Brooks. 638 P.2d 537, 542 (Utah 1981)); State v. 
Pascual, 804 P.2d 553, 555 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
6 
the Illinois Court of Appeals found that the use of two jury instructions which focused 
upon the patron's responsibility of care, ignoring the responsibility of the store, was 
reversible error. Fravel v. Morenz. 502 N.E.2d 480, 482 (111. Ct. App. 1986). In a case of 
the stabbing and beating of a prison inmate, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 
presumed harm where the trial court issued an instruction focusing the jury's attention on 
the difficulties of running a prison. Haith v. District of Columbia, 526 A.2d 17, 20 (D.C. 
1987). In that case, the Court held that "[t]he mere fact that an instruction correctly 
reflects the law (or does not misstate the law) does not necessarily mean that the judge 
should deliver it; if the instruction is argumentative, it is not for the jury to hear." IcL 
Courts have also found that the misuse of even one word may be reversible error. 
Where a defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter, the Kansas Supreme 
Court found that the trial court's charge that a person is allowed to defend herself against 
"immediate use of unlawful force," rather than "imminent use of unlawful force," as 
stated in the statute, constituted reversible error. State v. Hundley. 693 P.2d 475,480 
(Kan. 1985). 
Instructions which invite the jury to draw specific conclusions by directly focusing 
on the circumstances of the case are reversible error. In a landlord/tenant case, the 
Georgia Court of Appeals presumed harm where the trial court fashioned an instruction 
specifically describing the circumstances of the case and authorized a finding of punitive 
damages as compensation for the wounded feelings of the tenant. King v. Baker. 136 
S.E.2d 8, 10 (Ga. Ct. App. 1964). The Florida Court of Appeals presumed harm where an 
7 
"unavoidable accident" instruction was given after a go-cart driver lost control and 
injured four children watching a parade. Smith v. Canevary. 553 So.2d 1312, 1316 (Fla. 
Ct. App. 1989). Finally, in a criminal conspiracy case, the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals 
found that a charge allowing an inference that "a person intends the natural and probable 
consequences of what he does or knowingly fails to do" was reversible error.8 
Like the instructions in the cases above, the instructions in this case are reversible 
error. Five instructions focus upon Mr. Houghton's duty to provide support, while only 
the two elements instructions focus upon whether Mr. Houghton had just cause in failing 
to provide support. Aplt. Br. 23-24. Also, two instructions in this case are argumentative 
because they specifically describe the circumstances of this case and invite the jury to 
convict. Aplt. Br. 19-22. Finally, two instructions are legally incorrect. Aplt. Br. 16-19. 
In these circumstances, the jury was not accurately and adequately instructed regarding 
8
 U.S. v. SchillecL 545 F.2d 519, 524 (5th Cir. 1977). 
The United States Supreme Court recently held that a new trial was not required where 
the trial judge failed to instruct on an element of the crime because the error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. See Neder v. United States. 527 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1999). 
Neder does not affect the long-standing rule in Utah that failure to accurately instruct on 
all of the elements in a criminal case can never be harmless. Jones. 823 P.2d at 1061. First Utah 
appellate courts are not required to apply federal standards of review when presented with 
challenges to trial court determinations made under federal law. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 
1256, 1265 (Utah 1993). Rather, this Court is required to follow the mandate of the Utah 
Supreme Court authority and conclude that harmless error review is inappropriate since failure to 
accurately instruct a jury requires reversal as a matter of law. Lame, 618 P.2d at 35. See also 
State v. Harmon. 712 P.2d 291, 292 (Utah 1986) (Utah Supreme Court refuses State's request to 
conduct harmless error review where trial court failed to instruct on elements of crime). 
8 
the basic elements of the offense, and prejudice is presumed.9 
II. THE ISSUE OF WHETHER TWO JURY INSTRUCTIONS WERE 
LEGALLY INCORRECT WAS PROPERLY PRESERVED BECAUSE 
THE DEFENSE COUNSEL OBJECTED TO THEM ON THE BASIS THAT 
NEITHER AMOUNTED TO "A STATEMENT OF THE LAW" 
The State's argument that Mr. Houghton failed to preserve the issue of the legal 
correctness of instructions seven and eleven, Appellee's Br. 12-13, fails. The defense 
counsel properly objected to instructions seven, ten, and eleven on several bases, 
including incorrectness, in the judge's chambers before the jury retired to deliberate. R. 
141 [186-87]. Immediately after the jury retired, the defense counsel briefly summarized 
the discussion. R. 141 [186-87]. Among other things, the defense counsel said that these 
instructions did not amount "to statement of the law " R. 141 [186]. Specifically, she 
said: 
Your Honor, we did discuss instructions a while ago. And at that time I 
9
 See State v. Pearson, 1999 UT App 220,1(12, 985 P.2d 919 ("[B]ecause '[t]he general 
rule is that an accurate instruction upon the basic elements of an offense is essential' failure to 
provide such an instruction is reversible error that can never be considered harmless.") 
Further, even if a showing of prejudice was required, prejudice occurred in this case. The 
overemphasis of Mr. Houghton's duty to pay, as well as the incorrect, argumentative 
instructions, Aplt. Br. 16-22, foreclosed the jury's acceptance of the theory that Mr. Houghton 
had just cause in failing to pay child support. There was ample evidence of Mr. Houghton's 
health troubles and homelessness, his work history, and his payment history, which indicates that 
he paid when he was working. Aplt. Br. 4-8. There was no evidence that he ever failed to pay 
child support when he had the money. He was not idle when he could work, and he barely 
managed to support himself. R. 141 [134-50]. He would do the work that was offered to him. R. 
141 [150]. He changed jobs when he felt that his work was worth monetary compensation, and 
he was not so compensated. R. 141 [141]. If properly instructed, a reasonable jury could not have 
convicted Mr. Houghton. 
9 
indicated to the court that I had some objections to some of the instructions 
that were proposed by the State at which the Court ultimately gave. And I'd 
like to place those objections on the record and explain my reasons why. 
I am objecting, Your Honor, and objected in chambers to numbers 7,10, 
and 11. Each of those were proposed by the State. And in my view each of 
those amount not to statement of the law but rather a comment on the 
evidence. And in my view they are not warranted because there are 
instructions that provide both the element and the legal requirements of the 
defense of being unable to provide support. 
R. 141 [186-87] (emphasis added). Although this is an abbreviated summary of the actual 
discussion, it shows that one of the bases of counsel's objection was that the instructions 
were not an appropriate statement of the law. 
Further, the State's argument that the issue was not preserved under Rule 19(c) of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure u[b]ecause defendant did not assert below that 
instructions 7 and 11 misstated the law," Appellee's Br. 12, is simply wrong. There is no 
requirement that an appellant must set forth verbatim the words of the objection below. 
So long as the substance of the issue itself is presented to the trial court for consideration, 
it is preserved.10 As the Utah Supreme Court observed in State v. Johnson. "[o]ne of the 
primary reasons for imposing waiver rules . . . is to assure that the trial court has the first 
10
 See Campbell v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 2001 UT 89, |84,432 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 44 (examining the substance of defendant's challenges to expert testimony even though 
there was some question regarding the specificity of defendant's objections); State v. Casey, 
2001 UT App 205,1(6 n.2, 29 P.3d 25 ("when a trial court considers the merits of an issue raised 
in a motion for a new trial, the issue is preserved for appeal" even if the motioning party failed to 
raise the issue in his motion for a new trial) (citing State v. Seale. 853 P.2d 862, 870 (Utah 1993) 
(concluding objection to admission of videotape due to failure to comply with Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-411 was preserved for appeal because trial court addressed merits)); State v. Lucero, 866 
P.2d 1, 2 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (concluding objection to supplemental jury instruction was 
preserved for appeal because trial court considered and ruled on merits)). 
10 
opportunity to address a claim that it erred. If the trial court already has had that 
opportunity, the justification for rigid waiver requirements is weakened considerably." 
State v.Johnson. 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1991). 
In this case, the substance of the issue was presented to the trial court. The defense 
counsel's statement that instructions seven, ten, and eleven did not amount to a statement 
of law, but commentary on the evidence, R. 141 [186], went to both the incorrectness and 
argumentativeness of the instructions. Thus, the court was given the opportunity to 
consider the issue of correctness, and the issue is properly preserved. 
Significantly, Rule 19 was recently amended to clarify that it is the substance of 
the objection which must be preserved. Rule 19(c) formerly read as follows: 
No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission 
thereform unless he objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating 
distinctly the matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection. 
Notwithstanding a party's failure to object, error may be assigned to 
instructions in order to avoid manifest injustice. 
Utah R. Crim. 19(c) (2001). Several significant changes were made to soften the 
language of the rule and accommodate more easily the general rule of substantive 
preservation. Currently, the Rule reads: 
Objections to written instructions shall be made before the instructions are 
given to the jury. Objections to oral instructions may be made after they are 
given to the jury, but before the jury retires to consider its verdict. The 
court shall provide an opportunity to make objections outside the hearing of 
the jury. Unless a party objects to an instruction or the failure to give an 
instruction, the instruction may not be assigned as error except to avoid a 
manifest injustice. In [stating] the objection the party shall identify the 
matter to [which] the objection is made and the ground of the objection. 
11 
Utah R. Crim. 19(e) (Oct. 2001 Supp.) 
The new rule dropped the term "distinctly" from the phrase "[counsel must state] 
distinctly the matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection." Utah R. Crim. 
19(c) (2001). The phrase now indicates that "[i]n [stating] the objection the party shall 
identify the matter to [which] the objection is made and the ground of the objection." 
Utah R. Crim. 19(e) (Oct. 2001 Supp.) This clarifies that it is the substance of the 
objection which is significant. 
The new Rule also broadens the time and place at which objections may be made. 
Further, it approaches the preservation issue from a more positive standpoint. Under the 
current Rule, the preservation requirement is set out first in the sentence to read: "[u]nless 
a party objects to an instruction or the failure to give an instruction, the instruction may 
not be assigned as error " Utah R. Crim. 19(e) (Oct. 2001 Supp.) The previous rule 
began with the blanket statement that no part of the instructions may be assigned as error, 
with the exception of those to which counsel objects. Utah R. Crim. 19(c) (2001). 
In this case, the issue of the legal correctness of instructions seven and eleven was 
preserved, as required under Rule 19, by the substance of defense counsel's objection. R. 
141 [186-87]. The trial court, therefore, had an opportunity to address the issue. Further, 
even if the issue was not preserved, it should be reviewed to avoid manifest injustice. In 
State v. Stringham this Court held that the "[fjailure to give an elements instruction for a 
crime satisfied the manifest injustice standard under [Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure] 
19(c) and constitutes reversible error as a matter of law." State v. Stringham. 957 P.2d 
12 
602, 608 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting State v. Gibson, 908 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995)). Additionally, "because '[t]he general rule is that an accurate instruction 
upon the basic elements of an offense is essential,' failure to provide such an instruction 
is reversible error that can never be considered harmless." Stringham, 957 P.2d at 608 
(quoting State v. Souza. 846 P.2d 1313, 1320 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)). 
Here, the jury was not accurately instructed regarding the basic elements of the 
offense. The jury was incorrectly instructed that Criminal Non-Support is committed 
when partial payments of child support are "not adequate under the circumstances," R. 
83 (emphasis added), and that "[o]ne who fails to diligently seek employment or engages 
in activity causing the loss of employment does not have a lawful excuse to a failure to 
provide charge." R. 87 (emphasis added). 
Instruction seven is incorrect under the Criminal Non-Support statute. The statute 
does not focus upon whether the circumstances are adequate, but whether the child is in 
needy circumstances, or would be in needy circumstances but for the support of someone 
other than the defendant. Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201(1) (1999). Notwithstanding, the 
State asserts that the jury instructions were passable as a whole because the jury was 
accurately instructed in instructions five and six that a child must have been in needy 
circumstances, or would have been in needy circumstances but for the support of 
someone other than the defendant. Appellee's Br. 14-15 (citing instructions five and six). 
Such an argument is reasonable only when one instruction in the charge is slightly 
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inaccurate or inadequate.11 In this case, the partial payments instruction conveys a 
completely different idea than that conveyed in instructions five and six. By using the 
term "adequate," the partial payments instruction alluded to the subjective satisfaction or 
fulfillment of the child, as well as physical necessities. Further, instruction eleven was 
also incorrect, and this contributed to the overall inadequacy of the instructions. 
Instruction eleven indicated that a parent must "diligently seek employment" in 
order to avoid conviction for failure to support a child. R. 87. This instruction is not 
supported by statutory or case law and conflicts with the "reasonableness" charge in 
instruction ten. Aplt Br. 18-19. The State asserts, however, that "[g]iven the important 
and inalienable duty that a parent bears to support his children, the trial court correctly 
instructed the jury in instructions 10 and 11 that one way a parent could make 
'reasonable efforts to find ways to provide support for his children'... was to 
'diligently' seek and maintain employment." Appellee's Br. 19 (citations omitted). 
First, the State misrepresents the clear import of instructions ten and eleven. These 
instructions do not simply suggest that "one way a parent could make 'reasonable efforts 
to find ways to provide support' is to 'diligently' seek and maintain employment." Id. 
Instruction eleven unequivocally declares that "[o]ne who fails to diligently seek 
employment or engages in activity causing the loss of employment does not have a 
lawful excuse to a failure to provide charge." R. 87. 
11
 See Lucero, 866 P.2d at 3 ("if taken as a whole [the instructions fail to] instruct the 
jury on the law applicable to the case, the fact that one of the instructions, standing alone, is not 
as accurate as it might have been is not reversible error.") 
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Second, instruction eleven, and even instruction ten, is unsupported by statutory or 
case law. The Criminal Nonsupport statue makes no mention of the effort a parent must 
exert to provide support. Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201(1) (1990). It indicates only that 
criminal nonsupport is committed when a parent "knowingly and without just cause fails 
to provide for the support" of a child. Id. Notwithstanding, instructions ten and eleven 
impose the conflicting standards of "reasonableness" and "diligence" upon parents. 
In an effort to find support for these conflicting instructions, the State cites a 1933 
California Court of Appeals case which employs the term "reasonable diligence" in 
describing a parent's duty to provide support. Appellee's Br. 19 (quoting People v. 
Cased, 18 P.2d 389, 390 (Cal. Ct. App. 1933)). The State then quotes a footnote in a 
Nevada case which also used the term "reasonable diligence." Appellee's Br. 19 (quoting 
Epp v. State. 814 P.2d 1011,1014 n.6 (Nev. 1991)). Neither of these cases support the 
State's position. Not only are they not controlling in this jurisdiction, but neither case was 
ever relied upon in any jurisdiction. Further, neither case is illustrative of its jurisdiction's 
laws.12 
Additionally, the cases' use of the term "reasonable diligence" is not significant to 
the issue of whether jury instructions ten and eleven are incorrect and conflicting. 
"Reasonable diligence" carries a different meaning than either "reasonableness" or 
12
 See Moss v. Superior Court (Ortiz). 950 P.2d 59, 77 (Cal. 1998) (emphasizing that the 
failure to comply with a support order must be accompanied by willful failure to seek and accept 
employment before a conviction may be upheld); Sheriff v. Vlasak. 888 P.2d 441,443 (Nev. 
1995) (approving constitutionality of statute providing for the conviction of defendants who 
willfully or without lawful excuse fail to support their children). 
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"diligence." In Black's Law Dictionary, "reasonable diligence" is the same as "due 
diligence," which is defined as "[t]he diligence reasonably expected from, and ordinarily 
exercised by, a person who seeks to satisfy a legal requirement or to discharge an 
obligation." Bryan A. Garner, Ed. Black's Law Dictionary 468 (7th ed. 1999). On the 
other hand, "diligence" is defined as "[a] continual effort to accomplish something . . . 
[c]are; caution; the attention and care required from a person in a given situation." Id. 
"Reasonable" is defined as "[f]air, proper, or moderate under the circumstances . . . 
[ajccording to reason." IdL at 1272. These differences in definitions show that "diligence" 
and "reasonableness" are conflicting ideas, and that these terms cannot be reconciled by 
reference to the term "reasonable diligence" in two lone cases from other jurisdictions. 
Further, the case law in both Utah and other jurisdictions has, quite logically, 
focused upon what constitutes "just cause" for the failure to provide support.13 This 
demonstrates the inappropriateness of instructions ten and eleven. The focus of these 
instructions should have been on the legal element of just cause, and what was legally 
required with regard to that element. Instead, instructions ten and eleven move the focus 
13
 See State v. Bess, 137 P. 829, 832 (Utah 1913) (centering analysis of defendant's 
failure to support children on whether the evidence showed "willful dereliction" or "just excuse" 
for his failure to support); State v. Filon 13 P.3d 926, 928-29 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000) (focusing on 
whether defendant was "without lawful excuse" or "just cause" in failing to provide support) 
Taylor v. State. 710 P.2d 1019, 1021 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (focusing on whether defendant 
was "without lawful excuse" in failing to pay child support); State v. West, 735 P.2d 26, 27 (Or. 
Ct. App. 1987) (declaring that statutory language punishing those who "without lawful excuse" 
fail to provide for their children is constitutional); State v. Bauer, 595 P.2d 544, 547-49 (Wash. 
1979) (language indicating that the element of wilfulness is separate element of the crime and 
focuses on parent's knowing conduct and lack of excuse). 
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away from the State's burden of showing just cause and create a spontaneously improved 
category of whether Mr. Houghton's efforts were satisfactory under either a reasonable or 
diligent effort standard. This is incorrect, conflicting, and argumentative. Thus, as a 
whole, the instructions did not correctly educate the jury regarding the basic elements of 
the offense, and this is a manifest injustice which should be resolved by this Court. 
III. DAMAGE CAUSED BY ARGUMENTATIVE AND CONFUSING 
INSTRUCTIONS WHICH OVEREMPHASIZED ONE ELEMENT OF THE 
OFFENSE WAS NOT ALLEVIATED BY INSTRUCTIONS INDICATING 
THAT THE JURY IS THE EXCLUSIVE JUDGE OF FACT 
The State's argument that any errors in instructions seven, ten, and eleven were 
remedied by instructions one, twelve, and thirteen, Appellee's Br. 24-25, 29, is flawed. 
Instructions seven, ten, and eleven are erroneous because they are argumentative and 
inaccurate statements of the law. Aplt. Br. 12-26. Instructions one and twelve are not 
helpful because they focus upon the jury's duty as fact finder. R. 76, 88. Instruction 
thirteen is simply a general statement that instructions should be read as a whole, R. 76, 
88, and Mr. Houghton does not dispute this. 
Instruction twelve's general disclaimer of intention to influence the jury regarding 
the facts of the case is valueless in alleviating damage caused by the legally 
argumentative and inaccurate charges. Instruction twelve indicates that: 
If during the trial the court has said or done anything which has suggested 
to you that it is inclined to favor the claims or position of either party, you 
will not permit yourselves to be influenced by any such suggestion. The 
court has not intended to indicate any opinion as to which witnesses are or 
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are not worthy of belief, nor which party should prevail If any expression 
has seemed to indicate an opinion relating to any of these matters, you 
should disregard it, because you are the exclusive judges of the facts. 
R. 88. While this instruction may alleviate damage caused by a judge's comments 
regarding the veracity of a witness or, as the State indicates, the propriety of carrying a 
certain sized knife onto an airplane, Appellee's Br. 25, it is useless where the jury is not 
correctly and adequately instructed regarding the law. 
Further, instruction one clarifies that it is the Court's duty to correctly instruct the 
jury regarding the law, and that the jury must follow the law as it is stated.14 If the trial 
court fails to correctly and adequately instruct the jury, the fact that factual 
determinations are left exclusively to the jury, Id, R. 88, is of little use in correct the 
damage. 
Instruction thirteen is also not helpful because it focuses upon reading the 
instructions as a whole.15 The very essence of Mr. Houghton's argument is that, as a 
whole, the instructions are incorrect, argumentative, confusing, and overemphasized one 
element of the charge. Aplt. Br. 12-15. Significantly, five instructions directly 
14
 R. 76. Instruction one states that "it is the duty of the Court to instruct you in the law 
that applies in this case and it is your duty as jurors to follow the law as the Court states it to you, 
regardless of what you personally believe the law is or ought to be. On the other hand, it is your 
exclusive provence to determine the facts in the case and to consider and weigh the evidence for 
that purpose." Id. 
15
 R. 89. Instruction thirteen reads, u[i]f in these instructions any rule, direction, or idea 
has been stated in varying ways, no emphasis thereon is intended and none must be inferred by 
you. For that reason, you are not to single out any certain sentence, or any individual point or 
instruction and ignore the others, but you are to consider all the instructions as a whole and to 
regard each in the light of all the others." R. 89. 
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emphasized the duty to provide support. R. 80, 82, 83, 86, and 87. Only two addressed 
the "just cause" element, and these instructions were general elements instructions that 
did not focus solely upon the "just cause" element. R. 80, 82. 
The State's argument that instructions two and seventeen also addressed the "just 
cause" element, Appellee's Br. 28, is misleading. Instruction two mentioned "just cause" 
only because it was quoting the allegations in the Information.16 Instruction seventeen is 
not about the element of "just cause," R. 93, but the affirmative defense of being unable 
to provide support, as described in subsection 5(a) of the Criminal Nonsupport statute.17 
R. 77. Instruction two states: 
The defendant, STUART FOSTER HOUGHTON, is accused in an Information 
filed with this Court by the Attorney General of the State of Utah of having 
committed the crime of "Criminal Non-support," a Third Degree Felony, in 
violation of Section 76-7-201, Utah Code Annotated. The essential allegations of 
the Information are as follows: 
That on or between January 1,1993 and March 24, 2000, in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the defendant, STUART FOSTER HOUGHTON, whose child 
support arrearage exceeded $10,000.00, did knowingly and without just cause, 
fail to provide for the support of his minor child, to-wit: Hillary Houghton, while 
this child was under age and in needy circumstances, or who would have been in 
needy circumstances had it not been for support received from a source other than 
the defendant or provided by another on defendant's behalf. 
R.77. 
17
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-20l(5)(a) (1999). Instruction 17 states: 
It is a defense to the offense of Criminal Nonsupport that the accused was unable 
to provide support during the time period in question. Voluntary unemployment 
or underemployment by the accused does not give rise to that defense. 
The law does not require a defendant to establish that he was unable to provide 
support, as the burden of proof is always on the State and never shifts to the 
defendant. Rather, the law requires that the defendant bring forward some 
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In light of the above, the State's arguments that any damage caused by instructions 
seven, ten, and eleven was cured by instructions one, twelve, and thirteen, fails. 
IV. THE STATE FAILED TO POINT OUT ANY SUBSTANTIVE 
EVIDENCE MISSING FROM MR. HOUGHTON'S ARGUMENT THAT 
THE EVIDENCE. FULLY MARSHALED. IS INSUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE VERDICT 
The State's argument that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict, 
Appellee's Br. 30-33, is unpersuasive because the State does not point out any evidence 
that was not contemplated in Mr. Houghton's opening brief. 
First, the State asserts that Mr. Houghton misrepresented his college experience by 
stating he had attended only one year of college. Appellee's Br. 31. This is untrue. The 
opening brief indicates that Mr. Houghton attended "one year of college in 1966-67," 
Aplt. Br. 29, and later "studied respiratory therapy in the early 1970s before graduating 
with a welding degree." Id. The State also asserts that Mr. Houghton failed to list several 
jobs in his description of work experience. Appellee's Br. 31-32. However, Mr. 
Houghton stated that "[bjetween 1975 and the late 1980s, he worked at welding, 
substantial evidence which tends to show that he was unable to provide support. 
R. 93. If this instruction was meant to address the element of "just cause," it should not have 
categorized "just cause" as a defense to the crime. "Just cause" is an element of the crime which 
must be proved beyond reasonable doubt by the State. Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201(1) (1990). 
However, this instruction does not appear to focus upon "just cause," but upon the affirmative 
defense of inability to provide support as described in the current version of the statute, Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-7-20 l(5)(a) (1999) ("In a prosecution for criminal nonsupport under this 
section, it is an affirmative defense that the accused is unable to provide support. Voluntary 
unemployment or underemployment by the defendant does not give rise to that defense.") 
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fabricating, and similar-type jobs." Aplt. Br. 29. Mr. Houghton also cited to his resume, 
which listed specific jobs and described his jobs in detail elsewhere in the opening brief. 
Aplt Br. 4-9,29. Further, the State failed to point out any job that did not fall generally 
into the categories of welding and fabricating.18 
Next, the State indicates that Mr. Houghton's former wife had opined that the 
tremors in Mr. Houghton's hands correlated with his drinking, a neurologist diagnosed 
the tremors as benign, and Mr. Houghton stopped taking medication for the tremors 
solely because the medication made him feel uncomfortable. Appellee's Br. 31. These 
statements are misrepresentative of the evidence. Although Mr. Houghton's former wife 
speculated that drinking was a factor associated with the tremors, she also stated that it 
was nervousness which caused pronounced shaking.19 Further, the "diagnosis" of benign 
18
 Appellee's Br. 31-32. The State listed the following jobs: welding, draftsman, designer, 
shop foreman, field supervisor, blueprint reading and layout, building remodeling, painting, 
equipment maintenance, night watchman, and car cleaning. Id These all fall under the categories 
of welding and fabricating and are on Mr. Houghton's resume. 
19
 R. 141 [73-74]. Mr. Houghton's former wife testified as follows: 
Q: Would the shaking, was there any difference in the shaking and the drinking? 
Was there any correlation between the two? 
A: Well I thought so. But when he was nervous, like I am now, he would shake 
more when he was nervous. 
Q: Were there times when he wouldn't shake at all? 
A: Oh, yeah. 
Q: And you had known him for how many years to the time that you were 
divorced? 
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tremors was the result of a two-minute conversation with a doctor during which the 
doctor "didn't go in to any detail at all." R. 141 [117-18]. It was also unclear what he 
meant by "benign tremors." Id. Finally, the State mischaracterizes Mr. Houghton's 
testimony about his medication. Mr. Houghton did not stop taking the medication simply 
because it made him feel uncomfortable. He stopped taking it because, after nine months 
of it, he couldn't see any improvement in his tremors. R. 141 [119]. That, along with the 
uncomfortable side effects, led to his decision to stop taking the medication. IcL 
Finally, the State's assertion that "a reasonable jury could find, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that defendant's lack of gainful employment was not the result of a 
physical disability, but the result of his choice to remain voluntarily underemployed," 
Appellee's Br. 33, is contrary to the evidence. The evidence demonstrates that Mr. 
A: You mean before? 
Q: Yeah. The total period of time you knew him prior to the divorce. 
A: I met Stuart when I was 15. 
Q: Now during the time that you knew him did the shaking increase in frequency 
or severity? 
A: No. 
Q: Did he always kind of shake? 
A: Yes. 
R. 141 [74-75]. 
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Houghton had just cause20 in failing to provide the support. He was not idle when he 
could work, and he barely managed to support himself. R. 141 [134-50]. He did the work 
that was available. R. 141 [150]. He changed jobs when he felt that his work was worth 
20
 In a footnote in the opening brief, Mr. Houghton pointed out that the current version of 
the Criminal Nonsupport statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201(1) (1999), is unconstitutional 
because it lacks the "just cause" element. Aplt. Br. 26-27 n. 38. The State responds that the 
statute is acceptable because the inability to provide support is now an affirmative defense which 
must be disproved by the State after the defendant makes a threshold showing. Appellee's Br. 
34. 
In this case, the constitutionality of the current statute is not at issue because the former 
version of the statute containing the "just cause" element was properly used. R. 80-82. Thus, the 
constitutionality of the current version is not ripe for appeal and should not be considered. 
The current version of the statute is nevertheless unconstitutional. As the United States 
Supreme Court recognized in a series of cases including Patterson v. New York and Mullaney v. 
Wilbur, state legislatures may not simply "reallocate burdens of proof by labeling as affirmative 
defenses at least some elements of the crimes now defined in their statutes." Patterson v. New 
York. 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977). "[T]here are obviously constitutional limits beyond which the 
States may go in this regard. '[I]t is not within the province of a legislature to declare an 
individual guilty or presumptively guilty of a crime.'" Id. (citation omitted). 
While this body of case law is still under development, the due process clause and right 
to trial by jury prohibit the reallocation of the "just cause" element to affirmative defense status. 
See Jones v. United States. 526 U.S. 227, 239-49 (1999) (avoiding construction of a federal 
carjacking statute that would treat element of serious bodily harm as a mere sentence 
enhancement, as such a construction would cast grave questions upon statute's constitutionality); 
Almendarez-Torres v. United States. 523 U.S. 224, 230-31 (1998) (declining to rule that former 
convictions must be mentioned in indictment for illegal return of a deported alien because, 
among other things, recidivism is a typical sentencing factor rather than traditional element of 
offense, and Court found no statute making recidivism element of offense). This creates a 
presumption of the absence of "just cause" which the defense must then present evidence to 
disprove. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-504 (1999). 
Such a reallocation of proof is intolerable. While the State must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt the absence of just cause once the defendant makes an evidentiary showing, 
State v. Knoll. 712 P.2d 211,214-15 (Utah 1985), the statute opens up a traditional presumption, 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201 (1990), to the uncertainties of tangible proof in a courtroom. Thus, 
the removal of the "just cause" element is unconstitutional. 
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monetary compensation, but he was not so compensated. R. 141 [141]. He did not testify 
that he ever stopped looking for work, only despaired of finding work. R. 141 [150]. 
Because the State failed to present sufficient evidence that Mr. Houghton did not have 
just cause in failing to provide support, his conviction should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the above, Mr. Houghton's conviction should be reversed on the basis 
of insufficient evidence. Alternatively, his conviction should be reversed and this case 
should be remanded for a new trial because three of the jury instructions were incorrect, 
argumentative, inconsistent, and overemphasized one element of charge. 
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